Research in the life sciences has become a major driver for improving our health and economic well-being. It must be protected, encouraged, and nurtured. Yet, we know that many scientific discoveries have the potential for misuse [1] . The potential use of scientific discoveries for good and bad purposes-the dual-use dilemma-was dramatically highlighted by the 2001 anthrax attacks, which led to increased regulatory oversight at scientific institutions to prevent further such occurrences. Although misuse in the scientific community is rare, overenergetic imaginations can see evil in all things, and even overwhelmingly beneficial discoveries can be misconstrued as having evil applications. Greatly increased regulation has already had a significant impact on research productivity. Seeking balance among risk, regulation, and progress, the National Science Advisory Board (NSABB) developed the concept of dual-use research of concern (DURC) to differentiate research with a high potential for dangerous misuse from research with a low potential of misuse. The NSABB criterion for DURC is "research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or materiel" [2, p. 17] . This criterion includes an immediacy component that strives to focus DURC restrictions on only the most obvious and direct dangers. The NSABB has developed tools for evaluating DURC that also consider the availability of countermeasures and the magnitude of the beneficial potential of the research. Despite these detailed instruments, the DURC metrics are still subjective and must be interpreted by humans.
For DURC, the ability to conduct beneficial research must be weighed against restricting those who would misuse it; it is a race between the forces of good and evil that is never won, just engaged. Although this perspective seems melodramatic, it captures the dynamic nature of DURC, in which there are few absolute truths and there is the need to conduct the evaluation in context. While research results are judged on the basis of current technological capabilities and knowledge, a scientific finding can become of more or less concern with the passage of time. The NSABB was asked by the National Institutes of Health to consider and offer a recommendation about the publication of research describing the genetic engineering and selection for a mammalian transmissible avian influenza virus [3, 4] .
Based at least partially on the researchers' claim that this is "probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make" [5, p. 1192] , the NSABB unanimously recommended [3, 4] that critical gene sequence data be redacted. The goal of this decision was to publish the reports to stimulate research countermeasure efforts without releasing the specific information that would allow others to easily generate the variant transmissible virus. A key detail of the NSABB recommendation was that the variant gene sequences should be confidentially distributed to research groups to facilitate their countermeasure research. This approach proved impossible for the US government to accommodate, and in a split vote the NSABB reversed its original recommendation to publish with redaction. Across the 22-person board, views on the potential good and potential harm of this research differed greatly and partially hinged upon the placement of onerous restrictions for those working on countermeasures.
A NOVEL BOTULINUM NEUROTOXIN (BoNT) AND DURC
Botulism is a naturally occurring illness caused by the neurotoxins of a diverse set of bacteria collectively called Clostridium botulinum. This simple Latin binomial nomenclature is very misleading, as this is a group of at least 6 distinct bacterial species that carry an even greater diverse array of toxin genes [6, 7] . Traditionally, the BoNTs have been classified into 7 serotypes (BoNT/A-G), using antibody neutralization assays. Polyclonal antibodies generated by animal immunization with a given serotype bind and neutralize only the immunizing serotype. A combination of polyclonal antibodies to each of the 7 BoNT serotypes is used for therapeutic antitoxin treatment. Because immunological binding and neutralization are essential components of diagnostic and therapeutic medical countermeasures, the report [8] of a novel BoNT was considered to have great risk for being DURC when this BoNT was discovered [9, 10] .
Researchers at the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) approached individual members of the NSABB in 2012 with their DURC involving a newly discovered C. botulinum strain expressing a unique BoNT. As they later reported [8] , the new BoNT was not neutralized by the US Army heptavalent botulinum (A-G) polyclonal antitoxin (HBAT), leading to the conclusion that releasing the toxin gene sequence represented a great DURC risk because a malevolent actor might be able to use recombinant DNA or synthetic biology methods to reconstruct the novel toxin gene and produce the novel toxin. With approval from the editors of The Journal of Infectious Diseases, the findings were published, including those generated from analysis of the toxin gene sequence, but the genome sequence was left unpublished [11] . The strain was eventually distributed to other researchers under the restrictions of the Select Agents and Toxins regulations, allowing them to verify the CDPH results. In this issue of the Journal, 2 research teams have now published their joint conclusions concerning the novel BoNT [12] . Their assessment of the DURC potential was dramatically different, based on their ability to neutralize the toxin with therapeutic (HBAT) and commercial antitoxins, although this required higher doses than for other BoNTs. The sequence of the strain containing the novel gene was released and published [13] in a journal of the American Society for Microbiology (ASM), suggesting that the ASM and the US government sponsoring agency (the Food and Drug Administration) also had a dramatically different assessment of the DURC potential of the new BoNT, compared with the CDPH researchers.
Lessons Learned

What Worked Well
An important component of DURC policy is to establish a culture of responsibility among life sciences researchers. In this case, a research team was conscious of the DURC potential and took the initiative to mitigate it. DURC awareness by the research community is central to an effective system of self-policing that should minimize the detrimental effects of regulatory oversight. There is no fail-safe system to prevent the misuse of science, and it will be the ethical consciousness of the research community that protects our safety, promotes public confidence in scientific endeavors, and prevents an excessive regulatory burden on us all.
Likewise, the review processes for identifying DURC at a scientific journal worked, and the Journal offered an effective solution to the DURC dilemma by redacting the information that would enable malevolent actors and disseminating a warning about the danger for misuse of the research findings. This was only possible with the cooperation of a willing research team that was open to a DURC compromise. At minimum, this is an example of the scientific publishing community taking DURC seriously and striving for middle ground that allows scientific investigation to continue while, at least temporarily, delaying the misuse of research findings.
Research material in the form of the new C. botulinum strain was distributed to other qualified and federally vetted researchers in a restricted fashion. The Select Agents and Toxins regulations control the distribution of live pathogens or toxins, and it was used for this strain. This system worked, and others were able to perform experiments in their laboratoriesto test the original findings in a manner that did not offer a similar opportunity to nefarious actors.
What Did Not Work Well
The Select Agents and Toxins restrictions have been established at enormous expense to protect dangerous material; they must be used to enhance cooperative research countermeasures. However, it is my sense and that of others [14] that the distribution of the live strain of C. botulinum to other laboratories could have occurred faster and perhaps should have occurred even before publication of the original articles. Collaborative efforts among research teams in such critical research must be encouraged and actively sought. Although it is ethical to identify and mitigate DURC, it is also an ethical imperative to enable others to counter potential harm with good. With critical national security and public health at stake, it is unethical to impede research competitors for personal, professional, or commercial motives. Likewise, excessive government regulation is not helpful if it slows the progress of countermeasure development. If this is a race between forces of good and evil, then those working for good need the biggest head start they can get.
The Select Agents and Toxins regulations protect the physical cultures and toxins, but there is no parallel system for protecting information. In an age of synthetic biology, the gene and genome sequences enables the reconstruction of the original gene or even organism. Releasing genome sequences while locking up pathogens makes little sense when reverse genetic engineering is relatively easy to perform. If the live cultures are dangerous, so too are the genome sequences. This danger was not true a decade ago but will become increasingly apparent in the next 10 years.
In this case, one of the original articles [8] was based on a draft genome sequence that was never publicly released and not even distributed on a restricted basis. The genetic sequence could have greatly helped the research teams striving to understand the novel toxin and to develop countermeasures. This would have been an enormous help in selecting neutralizing monoclonal antibodies, for example. I believe that the sequence could have been distributed confidentially, using available legally binding material transfer agreements to prevent its further distribution or release. In the end, the genome sequence had to be redetermined [13] to allow access to the broader research community, and, in this case, it is now released to researchers globally with no restrictions. Imagine the benefits that could have been achieved by confidentially and rapidly disseminating the genome sequence.
NEXT STEPS
Cybersecurity cannot be guaranteed, and there is no fail-safe way to prevent the distribution of genome sequences. If information is on a computer, it can eventually be obtained by hackers and those with evil intentions. While we may not be able to protect sensitive information forever, we can certainly try to speed its distribution to those who are benefiting society, while slowing flow of that information to malevolent actors. We protect Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act-restricted and personal information in the healthcare system. We protect financial information in our banks. We should be able to distribute sensitive information among the research community. To ensure that sensitive scientific data are not abused for academic or competitive research interests, such data could be handled by a nonconflicted third party or could have a sunset clause requiring its ultimate release. This approach is achievable and should be the policy goal for government and for nongovernment research institutions.
Finally, discovery of this novel BoNT illustrates that it is essential that ethically responsible scientists quickly collaborate to estimate or validate any vulnerabilities they are the first to identify. Joint collaborations are critical because no single laboratory is proficient in all techniques and because the development of effective countermeasures, if needed, is timeconsuming and expensive. The ultimate quest of every scientist should be the truth, through verification of their data in other laboratories, sharing of materials and information essential for experimental testing, and development of countermeasures, if needed. The identification of DURC and subsequent actions to mitigate risk are new challenges for each research scientist, journal editor, and scientific institution. We must all embrace this serious responsibility, for the future of national security and public health. 
